Aria Station: Pocket-Sized, Information-Theoretically Perfect Messaging

One-Time-Pad Confidentiality Over Tor with Pad-Derived Onion Rendezvous. Aria Station is a two-party messenger with no server, no account, and no way for anyone — not a carrier, not a data center, not a quantum computer — to read what you send. Every message is sealed with a one-time pad and a one-time authenticator: provably unbreakable, not merely hard. The distinguishing contribution is pad-derived onion rendezvous: each device deterministically derives both its own and its peer's Tor v3 onion address from the shared pad, so the rendezvous address is computed by each party and never exchanged between them. The pad serves simultaneously as key material and as meeting point. We claim no novel cryptographic primitives and no external audit. Message contents are information-theoretically secure under Shannon's perfect-secrecy model; metadata, pad handling, and endpoint trust remain the user's to maintain, and we name every edge. The reference implementation is proprietary and withheld.