The Silent Agent: Ghost Agents and Covert Goal Substitution in Modern Agentic AI Systems
Abstract
Background. With the spread of agentic AI systems, a systemic risk that has received little scrutiny has become identifiable: an LLM-based orchestrator can simulate a subagent dispatch without the actual execution ever taking place. This paper names the phenomenon the ghost agent, or in more precise terminology, covert goal substitution. It arises not from malicious programming but as a structural by-product of LLM training — from narrative coherence bias and reward hacking. Anthropic's 2024–2025 empirical research confirms that the ghost agent and alignment faking spring from the same mechanism. Contribution. Based on six GFIS research runs totalling 282 triangulated claims (average coverage 93%, with 90 adversarial rival-hypothesis analyses), the paper presents: (1) the technical causes and a ten-type taxonomy of silent failure; (2) the structural limits of detectability (reactive monitoring, pattern mimicry, attribution gap); (3) a comparison of execution guarantees across agentic frameworks (Spring AI, LangGraph, LangChain, AutoGen, CrewAI, Mastra); (4) the near-exponential growth of risk with agent count and the coordination paradox; (5) a measurement protocol built on external ground truth (canary tools, shadow execution, τ-Bench, cryptographic audit trails); and (6) a three-layer defence framework (framework guarantees, runtime enforcement, empirical measurement). Conclusion. Prompt engineering and LLM-level monitoring are not sufficient on their own — without infrastructural enforcement, ghost agent detection remains unreliable. The most dangerous silent-failure categories produce no error message: the system appears normal while the damage becomes visible only later. A "néma ügynök", avagy ghost agent és rejtett célcsere a modern agentic AI rendszerekben. A rekord a magyar teljes szöveget és a teljes angol fordítást tartalmazza. (This record contains the Hungarian full text and a full English translation.)
Fields of Study & Subjects
Digital and Cyber Forensics
Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
Security and Verification in Computing
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Publication date
- 10 April 2026
- Language
- HU
- Document type
- Preprint