There is no mystery of consciousness, and the demand for explanation begs the question

'Consciousness', they say, 'is a mystery'. 'We have no idea what consciousness is.' 'The great intellectual task of our time is to explain the existence of consciousness.' This paper argues that these claims are false. Using 'ψ' to denote consciousness, it argues [1] that we know what ψ is (it's not a mystery); [2] that the idea that we need to explain the existence of ψ begs the question; [3] that ψ is the only thing in concrete reality that we know for certain to exist; [4] that ψ is the only thing in concrete reality whose qualitative nature we know; [5] that in experiencing ψ we know something of the nature of concrete reality as it is in itself; [6] that there is no other case in which we know something of the qualitative nature of concrete reality as it is in itself. It argues further [7] that [1] - [6] are fully compatible with physicalism in the original Vienna-Circle sense of the term; [8] that physicalism is compatible with panpsychism; and [9] that panpsychist physicalism is the most plausible (or if you prefer least implausible) view of the nature of concrete reality.