The Influence of Ownership Structure on Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Ownership structure, as the fundamental form of enterprise equity distribution, exerts a profound influence on the design and operational efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. While existing studies predominantly focus on empirical analyses of individual firms, this has led to fragmented theoretical insights. Drawing on principal – agent theory and related frameworks, this paper examines the characteristics of five types of ownership structures and the core dimensions of governance mechanisms. The analysis demonstrates that ownership structure shapes governance paths by determining the type and intensity of agency conflicts, while the legal environment plays a critical moderating role. Case studies of Apple, Shoprite, Kweichow Moutai, and Chia Tai Group are used to validate these conclusions. Based on this synthesis, the study refines the analytical framework of “ownership structure – agency conflict – governance mechanism – external regulation,” thereby addressing the theoretical fragmentation in existing research and providing a foundation for future empirical and comparative studies.