The Optimal Path for Chinese Enterprises to Adopt a Differentiated Voting Rights System: A Case Study of Magna International

Differentiated voting rights systems, as an important tool for balancing cor-porate financing needs and maintaining control, are widely used in global capital markets. However, they are also associated with numerous govern-ance risks. This article uses the case of Magna International, a Canadian company, to systematically analyze the risks associated with its differentiat-ed voting rights system. At the same time, it focuses on extracting the experience of the company's subsequent governance reforms, such as optimizing the decision-making process through the power check and balance mechanism and strengthening the transparency of information disclosure. Drawing on its experience with governance reforms, this article addresses the current state of the differentiated voting rights sys-tem in China’s Science and Technology Innovation Board (STAR Market). The article proposes optimization paths, including improving the limited resolution system, implementing a class shareholder voting mechanism, es-tablishing a lead independent director system, and strengthening exit mecha-nisms. These paths provide a reference for Chinese companies to utilize this system in a standardized manner.