Rational, Norms, and Strategy: The Dual-Logical Analysis of the Instrumental Attributes of International Institutions

As strategic competition among major powers continues to intensify, international institutions are increasingly evolving from platforms for promoting cooperation into tools of strategic rivalry, a trend driven by factors such as the strategic interests of major powers, technological advancements, and interactions between states and private entities. Building on the analytical foundation of the triple mechanisms of "deprivation, decoupling, and counterbalancing" proposed in existing research, this paper integrates the dual perspectives of rational choice institutionalism and social institutionalism to construct a comprehensive theoretical framework for explaining the weaponization of international institutions. This paper argues that the weaponization of international institutions is both a rational strategic choice by dominant states based on cost-benefit calculations and a social process involving the politicized reconstruction of the international normative order. Through the empirical research on three typical cases: SWIFT financial sanctions(deprivation mechanism), technological exclusion under the "Clean Network" initiative(decoupling mechanism), and rule competition in infrastructure alliances (counterbalancing mechanism), this paper reveals the differentiated combination form, interaction mechanism and intrinsic tension of dual logic in different weaponization mechanisms. This paper finds that the evolution of institutional weaponization in nowadays shows an upward trend from "utilizing existing systems" to "creating new rules", from "single-point strike" to "system competition".