Prāmāṇyavāda In Indian Epistemology: A Study of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Validity of Knowledge

Indian philosophy places significant emphasis on knowledge (jñāna) as the cornerstone of human understanding and intentional action. Philosophical systems markedly differ regarding the validation of knowledge and the determination of its truth. This issue is examined through the theory of Prāmāṇyavāda, which explores the nature and conditions of the validity (prāmāṇya) of knowledge. The ancient discourse on Prāmāṇyavāda centers on two contrasting theories: Svataḥprāmāṇyavāda, asserting that knowledge is inherently legitimate, and Parataḥprāmāṇyavāda, positing that validity is contingent upon external conditions. The former perspective is primarily supported by the Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta traditions, whilst the latter is methodically articulated by the Nyāya school. This work conducts a critical and comparative analysis of these two theories, scrutinizing their epistemological assumptions, logical foundations, and philosophicalramifications. This analysis aims to elucidate the Indian understanding of truth and to underscore the unique contribution of Indian epistemology to the world philosophical dialogue. Keywords: Prāmāṇyavāda, Indian Epistemology, Pramā, Pramāṇa, Svataḥprāmāṇya, Parataḥprāmāṇya, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā