Money, Instability and Public Action: A Policy‑Oriented Map for Administrators

Walras (1996) and Ricardo (1817) assume equilibrium to be inherent in the economy: competitive prices clear markets, and money is neutral. Keynes (1936) and Chick (1983) invert the emphasis: uncertainty and financial behaviour render instability normal, thereby causing crises to arise within the system. Orthodox approaches regard crises as exogenous, manageable within rule‑based fiscal frameworks; heterodox approaches, by contrast, link monetary relations to internal breakdowns. By comparing these competing frameworks, the paper shows how monetary assumptions bear on methods and evidence and, in practice, on how public administrators specify, sequence and evaluate fiscal–monetary instruments. The discussion is illustrated with Brazil (2015–2024). Because observation is paradigm‑bound, rival frameworks continue to organise evidence and methods, so consensus is episodic rather than automatic.