Disciplinary responsibility of a common court judge in light of the constitutional principle of the right to a trial

The specifics of disciplinary responsibility in a broad sense are currently seen in the nature of the relationships that this type of legal responsibility concerns. It is indicated that the basis for the existence of disciplinary responsibility is the belief in the validity of leaving certain matters related to the activities of a specific environment for consideration by that environment. Disciplinary offenses relate to violations of the rules of conduct within a given environment, and the state delegates specific powers in this regard to the appropriate authorities functioning within that group. The essence of distinguishing the disciplinary responsibility of common court judges is to subject the representatives of these judicial authorities, who ultimately decide on the freedoms, rights, and obligations of individuals, to a special legal responsibility regime. The article attempts to demonstrate that the disciplinary responsibility of common court judges serves a dual role. On the one hand, it is supposed to constitute a significant reinforcement of the fundamental feature of the judicial system, which is to base its activities on the principle of judicial independence. On the other hand, it appears as an element strengthening the classic forms of supervision over the activities of judges, as well as social control over the administration of justice.