Allah'ın Sıfatlarının Temellendirilmesinde Tekâbül Delili ve Eleştirisi

This article examines the argument of opposition (dalīl al-taqābul) and its critiques in classical kalām tradition regarding divine attributes. The ar-gument posits that the absence of any attribute necessarily entails its opposi-te's presence, suggesting that the absence of a perfection attribute in God would necessitate an imperfection, contradicting divine status. The research analyzes the argument's utilization in early Ashʿarī and later Māturīdī schools. Ashʿarī scholars employed it to establish God's attributes of hearing, seeing, and speech, while Māturīdīs used it for attributes like life, power, and knowledge. In the later period, scholars from various schools, including al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), al-Andukānī (d. 777/1375), Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), al-ʿAlawī (d. 749/1348), al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), and al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), directed substantial criticisms towards this argument. Their criticisms centered on two main points: the impossibility of generalizing from the visible world to the unseen realm due to God's absolute uniqueness, and that an attribute's absence doesn't neces-sarily imply its opposite's presence. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) strongly defended the argument, claiming its critics interpreted the concept too nar-rowly. This methodological debate reflects the sophisticated nature of Isla-mic theological discourse and its historical development. The study systema-tically demonstrates the argument's historical transformation, methodologi-cal foundations of criticisms, various applications by different schools, Ibn Taymiyya's defensive approach, and its functional limitations in the later period. This was achieved through establishing the conceptual framework of opposition, examining its usage in different traditions, evaluating later period criticisms, and analyzing its historical development comparatively.