Privatrechtliche Informationspflichten im Recht der Investmentfonds: Zugleich eine spieltheoretische Untersuchung des deutschen und luxemburgischen Rechts

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Authors: Phillip Cannell
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Abstract

Information asymmetries pose significant obstacles to the enforcement of rights by investment fund investors. This study explores the scope of information rights available to investors vis-à-vis management companies and depositaries under German and Luxembourg private law. Drawing on game-theoretical models, it develops an innovative framework for evaluating the effectiveness of such rights. The analysis demonstrates that it is solely German law which empowers investors to effectively challenge deficiencies in portfolio management. The work is directed at scholars and policymakers, while also offering valuable insights for institutional investors.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Finance Markets and Regulation Legal principles and applications Corporate Governance and Law

Publication details

Journal / source
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG eBooks
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Book