A Not-So-Minimal Self? The Immutability of the Experiential Self in Question

View at publisher Summarise with VIRAT
Authors: Agustina María Lombardi, Romanian Society for Phenomenology
Cited by: 0

Summary

No summary yet. VIRAT can read this paper and write a plain-language summary of its aim, methods, key findings and limitations.

Summarise with VIRAT Free to try with your Science Catalogs account.

Abstract

This paper reinterprets the notion of the minimal self, usually iden­tified with the core and experiential self, within phenomenological psychiatry. It criticises the thesis asserting the immutability of the minimal self, positing that this dimension comprises two distinct levels: a more formal, immutable level and a more robust level susceptible to change. In the first section, I show how contemporary phenomenologists identify the minimal self as the experi­ential and core self. In the second, I question the claim of the minimal self ’s invariability by exploring phenomenological insights into schizophrenia and critiques related to borderline personality disorder. Finally, I advance a nuanced distinction within the core self, arguing that while the more minimal aspect remains stable across psychopathological conditions, the less minimal aspect is vulnerable to alteration.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Mental Health and Psychiatry Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Publication details

Journal / source
Studia Phaenomenologica
Volume
26
Pages
213–235
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN