Principiul independenței judecătorului în europa. geneză și evoluție

The goal of this study is to explore the genesis and evolution of the principle of judicial independence in Europe. It starts with the premise that democracy is only complete when popular sovereignty is neatly combined with the rule of law, which cannot exist without balancing the three separate powers. Although the doctrine of dividing the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government among separate and independent bodies can be traced to antiquity, it was firstly formulated in a comprehensive manner by the Baron of Montesquieu. Since the second half of the 18th century, when judicial independence started to gain a broad and powerful appeal in Western Europe, it has remained particularly sensitive to oscillations in the balance of powers. The paper asserts that the inability of many (nominally independent) European judges to protect fundamental human rights during the interwar period led after the Second World War to critical developments in the realm of judicial independence. The paper also underlines the need to constitutionally supplement the rule of law concept with material elements of unceasing nature, without which the recognition of the independence of the judiciary remains void of substance when it matters most.