Co-opetition strategies in live streaming commerce: a game theory perspective

This paper examines the strategic interactions between a start-up firm (he) and an established live streaming firm (she) in live streaming commerce. Using a game model, the paper explores three scenarios: (1) competition, (2) co-opetition with a live streaming selling service, and (3) co-opetition with a live streaming training service. The findings indicate that the spillover effect can enhance profits for both firms, particularly the one with greater bargaining power. For the start-up firm, the training service is optimal when consumer time sensitivity is low. Under this condition, training significantly enhances his live streaming ability and enables him to outperform the live streaming firm. For the live streaming firm, providing training is optimal only when the training cost is low; otherwise, she prefers to offer the selling service, particularly when the spillover effect, product substitution effect, and her own popularity are high. The optimal cooperation strategy for both firms is context-dependent: generally, the selling service is preferred in low-tier markets or when the spillover effect is strong, while the training service is favored when the training cost is low. This research sheds light on key strategic choices for live streaming e-commerce operators seeking to optimise their collaboration and competitive positioning.