AAI-01 - Responsibility Without a Bearer

AAI-02 - Responsibility Without a BearerThis paper advances a structural account of moral agency grounded in the concept of interruptibility. Contemporary debates in AI ethics, philosophy of action, and responsibility theory frequently assume that agency is secured by intelligence, intention, or behavioral coherence. This paper challenges that assumption.It argues that moral agency does not depend primarily on cognitive sophistication or representational capacity, but on the existence of structurally available veto points within a decision architecture. When interruptibility is displaced—through automation, delegation, or systemic optimization—agency persists behaviorally while responsibility becomes structurally unanchored.The paper develops three core claims:Agency is not reducible to behavior or goal-directedness.Responsibility requires custody over decision interruption.Systems can preserve the appearance of control while eliminating practical veto power.By reframing agency as a structural condition rather than a psychological property, the paper provides a conceptual bridge between debates in AI alignment, collective responsibility, democratic legitimacy, and the philosophy of free will. Interruptibility is proposed as the minimal practical condition for moral agency in complex socio-technical systems.Upcoming: PFS - 05 - Infrastructure & Digital Backbone Constraints (3 Mar).Upcoming: AAA - 05 - Why Moral Responsibility Survives the Death of Consciousness (5 Mar).