Ideology and judicial independence: who undermines high courts in democracies?

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Authors: Alice Timken
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Abstract

This mixed-methods study explores the role of political ideology in sustaining judicial independence in democracies, focusing on populism. First, I model judicial independence cross-nationally from 1975 to 2014 and find that populist views, measured as anti-pluralist and anti-elite views, among legislative and executive incumbents correlate with lower levels of judicial independence. Second, I find congruent evidence in a within-case study of Poland from 2005 to 2024. These analyses are consistent with an increasingly common but under verified proposition, that populist incumbents oppose high court independence globally, and suggest that ideology influences politicians’ strategic evaluations of high courts.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Judicial and Constitutional Studies Political Theory and Democracy Populism Right-Wing Movements

Publication details

Journal / source
Figshare
Publication date
31 March 2026
Language
EN