The popular election of members of the Judiciary in Mexico: democratic deepening or institutional regression? A comparative and normative analysis from a Latin American perspective

The judicial reform approved in Mexico in 2025 introduced an unprecedented change by establishing the popular election of judges, magistrates, and ministers, arguing that this would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary.This institutional shift has been presented as a deepening of popular sovereignty and a way to combat corruption and judicial elitism.However, the process has generated intense debate about its implications for judicial independence and the balance of powers.This article critically analyzes this process from a normative and comparative approach, using the cases of Bolivia and the United States as references.The research warns that, in the absence of institutional safeguards, the popular election of judges can facilitate the capture of the judiciary by dominant political actors, erode judicial impartiality, and weaken the principle of separation of powers.The analysis identifies specific risks arising from the Mexican reform, such as the politicization of the disciplinary tribunal, the reduction of terms of office, the budgetary link with the executive branch, and low citizen participation, which highlight the fragility of this model in contexts of low legal culture and high polarization.Based on international standards on judicial independence and comparative experiences, it is concluded that the democratization of the justice system requires mechanisms that balance citizen participation with judicial professionalization and impartiality, preventing direct election from becoming an instrument of political control rather than a democratic guarantee.