TENTATIVA BRITANICĂ DE APROPIERE DE U.R.S.S. ÎN TOAMNA LUI 1940 ŞI OBSERVAŢII, PE BAZA SURSELOR BRITANICE, DESPRE TEORIILE PRIVITOARE LA PROIECTELE SOVIETICE DE OFENSIVĂ ÎN VEST

In autumn 1940, the UK attempted to court the USSR to counter Axis influence, temporarily recognizing Soviet territorial gains (Baltics, Bessarabia, etc.) through Ambassador Stafford Cripps. He justified USSR’s actions as defensive, arguing that the occupation of Eastern Poland and the Baltics aimed to preempt German expansion. The British proposal included de facto recognition of Soviet territorial acquisitions and post-war cooperation in exchange for USSR’s neutrality. Stalin ignored the offer, prioritizing negotiations with Germany, culminating in Molotov’s visit to Berlin (November 1940), where Hitler tried to lure the USSR into the Tripartite Pact. Although historians like Suvorov and Meltiuhov argue the USSR planned a preventive offensive in 1941, British documents do not confirm this. The UK observed massive Soviet troop concentrations on the western border but interpreted them as defensive measures or intimidation, not invasion preparations. Intelligence on mobilizations was attributed to the need to counter a potential German aggression, not an offensive plan. Churchill even warned Stalin of the imminent German attack in April 1941, reflecting British confidence in the USSR’s defensive stance.