SLOT HOARDING: UNRAVELLING REGULATORY IMMUNITY, STRATEGIC FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS, AND THE COMPETITION

The paper examines how dominant Indian carrier, namely IndiGo, have cancelled scheduled flights while retaining airport slots, exploiting DGCA slot-retention policies to entrench market power. The DGCA’s slot allocation framework, incorporating an “80% use-it-or-lose-it” rule is intended to prevent hoarding, but practical enforcement gaps allow dominant carriers to cancel flights without relinquishing slots. We argue that these tactical cancellations can amount to abuse of dominance under Section 4 of India’s Competition Act, 2002, as they effectively “limit or restrict” services and discriminate against consumers. Yet sectoral regulation has insulated airlines from competition scrutiny: the DGCA focuses on safety and slot release, while the CCI has only belatedly intervened after public outcry. A comparative EU analysis shows that EU law (Regulation 95/93 and cases like Delta/Heathrow) actively polices slot misuse via usage mandates and structural remedies. Theoretically, we argue such conduct resembles slot hoarding and an essential facility denial, exploiting regulatory overlap to evade antitrust law.