FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ACCOUNTABILITY: REFORMING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ACCOUNTABILITY: REFORMING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS Mayur Mahajan, B.B.A. LL.B.(H) 2nd Year, Jaipur National University, Jaipur (India) Labdhi Tervecha, B.B.A. LL.B.(H) 2nd Year, Jaipur National University, Jaipur (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2025.v03.211 Judicial appointments represent a vital democratic mechanism, balancing judicial independence with public duty and transparency. This paper examines appointment systems throughout a couple Judicial appointments represent a vital democratic mechanism, balancing judicial independence with public duty and transparency. This paper examines appointment systems throughout a couple of jurisdictions, reading how democracies navigate tensions among protective judicial impartiality and making sure democratic legitimacy in selection methods. Through comparative constitutional analysis of govt appointments, legislative confirmations, judicial carrier commissions, and hybrid fashions, this study identifies key demanding situations: political interference, inadequate range, opaque selection criteria, and declining public believe in judicial institutions.