Beyond Saving Ink: How the Current Court Finds Meaning in the Textual Variations Post-Loper Bright

This case comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in San Francisco v. EPA, a pivotal moment illustrating the Court's renewed emphasis on strict statutory interpretation and finding significance in subtle textual variations to limit agency power in the post-Loper Bright era. The case centered on the EPA's attempt to impose "end-result" prohibitions in San Francisco's NPDES permit, forbidding discharges contributing to water quality violations or creating pollution under state law. San Francisco argued that these provisions exceeded the EPA's authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act, contending that "any more stringent limitation" does not authorize such broad mandates lacking specific, measurable limitations on the facility's discharges. Applying a strict textualist approach, the Court held that § 1311(b)(1)(C) does not permit the EPA to impose end-result requirements focused on the ultimate condition of the water body rather than the permittee's specific discharges, emphasizing Congress's intentional omission of "effluent limitations" in this subsection compared to preceding ones. This decision highlights the Court's readiness to override decades of agency practice if it conflicts with the statutory text, signaling increased judicial scrutiny of agency interpretations in environmental and administrative law post-Loper Bright, potentially leading to narrower, more literal interpretations absent a clear statutory basis for agency actions. Justice Barrett's partial dissent advocated for a broader interpretation of "limitation" to encompass the EPA's end-result requirements as necessary for meeting water quality standards, but the majority's ruling underscores how the Supreme Court expects the judiciary to take an assertive role in interpreting statutory language and limiting agency power.