Explanation: An Exploration

Inquiry into any domain is often fueled by a desire to find explanations. Throughout the sciences, for example, we wonder about questions like: why is the patient experiencing these symptoms? Why are these genetic mutations in mammals occurring? Why did this chemical reaction occur? Why did the proton move up rather than down? The philosophical domain is no different. We often do philosophy with a drive to find explanations. In virtue of what are certain actions good or bad, right or wrong? Why should we (if at all) obey the state? Why is there this world rather than something else or nothing at all? Seeking explanations, therefore, is in some sense fundamental to the philosophical enterprise. Divided into four chapters, the dissertation explores how the nature of explanation bears on several important areas across metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and ethics. The first disambiguates different logical features of explanation, and defends some over others. The second employs plural logic to advance an abductive explanatory argument for metaphysical foundationalism. The third advances an explanation for God’s existence. The fourth draws on the nature of explanation to explain why moral authority is often generated from explanatory relations obtaining.