Replication Data for: Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security

How does the institutionalization of external security cooperation affect government–military relations? This question has become increasingly salient in light of a dramatic increase in bi lateral defense cooperation agreements in recent decades. This paper argues that DCAs help stabilize government–military relations and bolster regime security by mitigating a persistent credibility problem between signatory governments and their armed forces. By securing nonfungible, military-specific resources, DCAs limit the government’s ability to divert benefits elsewhere. The involvement of partner states further enhances credibility, as reneging on these bilateral agreements carries diplomatic and reputational costs. Because the military depends on the government to sustain these arrangements, the costs of plotting a coup increase: any extra constitutional removal of the government threatens the institutional channels through which critical resources flow. I evaluate this argument using a cross-sectional time-series dataset of 160 countries from 1980 to 2010. Across multiple specifications—including mixed-effects logistic regression, instrumental variables, and difference-in-differences models—states with one or more DCAs exhibit significantly lower odds of coup attempts. The study highlights the role of international agreements in shaping domestic political stability. It also expands our understanding of states’ unique role in managing domestic civil-military relations through international brokerage and cooperation.