Reliability as resolve: reputational transference in international relations

While reputation has a broad connotation in the study of deterrence, empirical analyses typically assess resolve by narrowly examining states' past conflict behavior as primary belligerents. However, this focus often overlooks how states' conduct as allies shapes external perceptions of their resolve and credibility. In this paper, I contend that a reputation for reliability—the record of honoring past alliance commitments—crucially shapes states' resolve, thereby directly affecting their deterrence against external aggression. A reputation as an unreliable ally (a) makes finding future allies more costly and (b) lowers the reputational costs for current allies to break their commitments. So, states with poor reliability experience substantial changes in their (perceived) costs of fighting. Potential challengers view these developments as affecting the target state's willingness to risk war and, consequently, are more likely to exert coercive pressure by initiating conflict. I test this argument using a dynamic measure of reputation based on cross-sectional time-series data spanning 1816 to 2000. The findings show that a state's poor reliability significantly increases the likelihood of being targeted in an interstate conflict. The analysis highlights an additional mechanism of reputational transference, underscoring how alliance politics shapes assessments of resolve in interstate conflicts.