Replication Data for: Firm Influence in International Organizations: The Case of OECD Tax Evasion Regulations

Within political institutions insulated from money in politics and domestic electoral considerations, to what extent are non-state actors able to influence regulations? Many international organizations (IOs) are composed only of state members, but their regulations have far-reaching consequences for non-state actors. This paper sheds new light on the influence of non-state actors, particularly firms, on regulations with a focus on the case of OECD tax evasion regulations. I argue that firms and industry associations work to build positive reputations with bureaucrats through broad based and quality written public comments to further their policy preferences. I present evidence that bureaucrats make decisions in line with these expectations through quantitative analysis of a new dataset of 3349 OECD public comments, natural language processing methods, and 38 in-depth interviews. The results indicate that stakeholder engagement may be a double edged sword: while intended to democratize access to the policymaking process, even these fora are susceptible to strategic firm behavior. However, while well-resourced firms and associations are at an advantage in having their voice heard in the creation of regulations, smaller firms that invest substantially in the process can have an out-sized influence. International taxation also represents a substantively important case of non-state actor influence given the successful coordination of 149 countries on new tax regulations.