Replication Data for: Boehmke, Frederick J.; Charles R. Shipan; Benjamin Goehring; and Tracee Saunders. N.D. “Oversight From Below and Above: Individual and Institutional Legislative Influence on Agencies”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations (forthcoming).

This dataset includes data files and statistical code needed to replicate the analysis in the associated article. Abstract: Legislatures influence executive agencies through oversight. We argue that individual legislators’ preferences – in addition to institution-level preferences – can influence agencies’ actions, especially when legislators are in the majority party. Using data on 216,331 inspections of 17,913 nursing homes conducted by U.S. state agencies between 2000 and 2017, we test the independent and conditional influence of both individual legislators and collective legislative institutions on the number of citations that agencies issue to nursing homes. We show that agencies issue 6% more citations per inspection to nursing homes in districts with liberal legislators and 20% more citations in states with liberal legislatures. We also demonstrate that individual legislators’ influence is conditional on majority party status, at least in states’ upper chambers, with nursing homes in a liberal member’s district experiencing more citations when the legislator is in the majority party. Overall, our findings show that both individual members and collective institutions influence agencies, but the influence of the former is partially contingent on the latter.