Coordination With and Without Incentives

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Authors: Pablo Montero Lomas
Cited by: 0

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Abstract

This file explains how to replicate the analysis for the paper “Coordination with and without incentives”. Authors are Pablo Brañas-Garza, Diego Jorrat and Pablo Lomas. The paper studies whether monetary incentives affect behavior in simple 2×2 coordination games. Participants were randomly assigned to either a monetary or a hypothetical payment scheme and played two coordination games: one with a payoff-dominant equilibrium and another with a risk-dominant equilibrium. The paper reports two studies, with sample sizes of 242 and 301 participants, respectively.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Applications Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Publication details

Journal / source
Harvard Dataverse
Publication date
18 March 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Dataset