The Legal Desirability of Tokenized Money: A Comparative Analytical Framework

This paper examines the legal desirability of tokenized money through a comparative analysis of regulatory approaches across major jurisdictions. Legal desirability denotes the systematic evaluation of whether novel monetary instruments should be introduced and under what regulatory conditions. The research reveals a fundamental paradox: technological convergence in tokenization capabilities intersects with persistent regulatory divergence across central bank digital currencies, tokenized deposits, and stablecoins. Analysis of wholesale-retail dynamics, financial stability trade-offs, privacy-AML/CFT balance, and adoption challenges demonstrates that jurisdictions rationally reach different conclusions based on payment system contexts, institutional capacity, and policy objectives. Empirical data confirms the emergence of a multifaceted digital monetary system: wholesale digital currencies issued by central banks for interbank settlements, tokenized deposits for programmable payments, and regulated stablecoins for cryptoasset markets. The framework reveals that tokenization subordinates monetary instruments to computational logic, creating infrastructural legal primacy that challenges constitutional monetary sovereignty. Legal desirability requires context-specific assessment rather than universal technocratic determination.