The effect of task framing : choosing versus rejecting

Early rational choice theories posit that preferences should remain consistent regardless of how options are framed or how preferences are elicited (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). However, this assumption has been frequently violated in real-world decision-making, leading to increasing scholarly attention since the 1990s to understand the underlying mechanisms and causes of these violations. This study aims to investigate the violation of procedure invariance by examining how framing a task as either a choice or a rejection, despite their intuitive equivalence, influences decision outcomes. The findings of this thesis reveal a previously overlooked shift in preferences when the same decision task is framed as a rejection rather than a choice. The first essay presents a meta-analysis that synthesizes findings from existing research, providing preliminary evidence on how task framing affects decision-making outcomes. We propose the concept of "choice-rejection asymmetry," suggesting that individuals exhibit less extreme preferences in rejection tasks compared to choice tasks. Specifically, our analysis reveals that decisions made in rejection tasks are less polarized, with the proportion of an option being selected in rejection tasks tending to be closer to 50% than in choice tasks. These findings offer additional evidence that procedural invariance is violated, demonstrating that preferences are influenced by the framing of a task. The second essay further investigates this choice-rejection asymmetry in intertemporal decisions, where individuals decide between a smaller, sooner reward and a larger, delayed reward. It is proposed that choice decisions are more likely to rely on a single salient attribute, while rejection involves more comprehensive trade-offs between attributes. The findings from five experiments support our choice-rejection asymmetry hypothesis. In intertemporal decisions with low discount rates, individuals show a strong preference for the smaller, sooner option in choice. As the discount rate increases, the larger, later option becomes more salient, leading to its selection. In rejection tasks, however, the increased trade-offs result in less extreme decisions, with the selection of each option converging closer to 50%. The third essay addresses the conflicting findings and theoretical explanations proposed by three well-established theories in task framing literature (Shafir, 1993; Ganzach, 1995; and Wedell, 1997) and further explores the proposed choice-rejection asymmetry. In this chapter, we first provided a detailed comparison of their models, identifying their limitations. Based on these insights, we designed new studies in which we manipulated either the overall attractiveness or the variability of options across two experiments. Our findings show that preference changes are contingent on whether an option is enriched or impoverished. However, when options differ only in overall attractiveness, choice and rejection tasks lead to equivalent outcomes. Furthermore, this chapter reinforces the decision pattern observed in the previous two essays, where rejection consistently results in less extreme selections compared to choice. In conclusion, this thesis deepens the understanding of task framing by revealing a previously overlooked decision pattern, showing that rejection leads to less extreme decision outcomes. The findings provide valuable insights and implications for decision-makers and marketers.