Psychological plurality and practical action : a challenge for Rawlsian equilibrium

Read full text Summarise with VIRAT
Authors: Jacob Sipes
Cited by: 0
References: 125

Summary

No summary yet. VIRAT can read this paper and write a plain-language summary of its aim, methods, key findings and limitations.

Summarise with VIRAT Free to try with your Science Catalogs account.

Abstract

Background and Gap John Rawls’ reflective equilibrium remains a dominant method for moral justification. Proponents support its theoretical usefulness (e.g., Scanlon, 2002; Daniels, 1996). However, Rawls (1951) also intends the method for practical guidance during dilemmas. While critics raise some practical concerns (e.g. Arras, 2009; Carson, 2010), its reliability for guidance remains underexamined. Method and Findings As a novel contribution, this project investigates a.) if there are complications with the method’s practical guidance, b.) whether these complications stem from its psychological underpinnings. This investigation uses three approaches: 1. Practical Testing: I test Rawls’ method against action dilemmas from diverse backgrounds. I assess its general reliability for action guidance. These cases reveal complications from intrapersonal plurality—distinct yet overlooked psychological features that may constitute everyday dilemmas. 2. Theoretical Examination: Through primary source exegesis, I excavate the method’s psychological premises. Then I compare them against empirical research (e.g., Dual Process Theory, Moral Foundations Theory). This analysis indicates that Rawls’ method may overlook psychological features of both intrapersonal and interpersonal pluralities, which may constitute dilemmas it aims to resolve. 3. Practice-Theory Analysis: By analyzing the relationship between the practical and theoretical issues, I show that guidance problems may stem from Rawls’ psychological oversights. Thesis and Stakes To summarize findings, this project argues that Rawls’ method risks unreliability. It seems to depend on suspect psychological premises to offer action prescriptions. Premises may neglect key psychological features, both intrapersonal and interpersonal, which may constitute the moral dilemmas the method targets. Thus, agents in real-world contexts may sense that the method’s solutions are unsatisfactory due to such oversights. Rawls’ account of moral judgment seems out of step with everyday decision-making. If correct, the method may need extensive revision to address psychological plurality—or rethink its practical role. These stakes extend to broader debates about how practical methods interact with everyday decision-making.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Political Philosophy and Ethics Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Publication details

Journal / source
Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick)
Publication date
17 September 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Thesis