Round Addition Differential Fault Analysis against the Lightweight Block Cipher CHAM

Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers 2026

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Authors: Kento Sato, Hideki YOSHIKAWA, Masahiro Kaminaga
DOI: 10.9746/sicetr.62.53
Cited by: 0
References: 7

Abstract

This paper applies round-addition differential fault analysis to the lightweight cipher CHAM, recovering full secret keys with few additional rounds: 2 for CHAM-64/128, 1 for CHAM-128/128, and 2 for CHAM-128/256.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Cryptographic Implementations and Security Coding theory and cryptography Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic

Publication details

Journal / source
Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers
Volume
62
Issue
1
Pages
53–55
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN