'Inmortalitatis Cupido' : (anti-)Platonic perspectives on the soul in the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions

The early fifth-century Latin Recognitions engage with several significant debates in contemporary philosophy: the role of emotions, the relationship to God (as the image of God), the concept of life, the soul’s immortality, and free will. This brief contribution aims to present insights regarding the Recognitions as a narrative that should also be approached as early Christian philosophical discourse, particularly concerning the nature of the soul and the role of emotions. The Recognitions constitute a Christian novelistic narrative about the quest of a troubled young Clement of Rome in search of truth regarding God, humankind, and creation. However, this quest is underpinned by extensive religious and philosophical discussions between Peter and his arch-opponent Simon Magus, as well as the teachings of Peter and his disciples. It is precisely here that the Recognitionist narrative manifests itself as an early Christian philosophical text, which has received insufficient attention from a philosophical perspective. Moreover, it is evident that Plato's philosophy provides essential tools for further contemplation for the author of this narrative. This contribution analyses specific passages, primarily in Recognitions VII, VIII, and IX, where Plato's theory of the tripartite soul is rejected, his Phaedran Chariot myth is altered, and where the soul is distinctly dissociated from the notion of life. To better understand the background of these philosophical insights and the role of Plato's reception, I examine both earlier and contemporary (Christian and non-Christian) philosophers, such as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen of Alexandria, who develop similar arguments.