Public Persuasion

HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) 2026 Preprint

Authors: Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou
Cited by: 0

Abstract

This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade multiple receivers, possibly having heterogenous beliefs, with the same information for all. We show that public persuasion constrains the sender in how he can influence the beliefs of receivers: if the sender wants to influence the beliefs of one particular receiver, he loses all controls over the beliefs of the others.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Publication details

Journal / source
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe)
Publication date
9 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint