A Refutation of the Gettier Problem and a Defense of the Perfection of JTB Theory (in Korean)

This paper argues that the Gettier problem does not refute the traditional justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge. I propose a diagnosis of standard Gettier cases according to which the apparent counterexamples trade on a mismatch between the justification that supports the belief and the fact that makes the belief true, or on background defeaters that are tacitly ignored. Once the relevant justification is specified and defeaters are properly handled, the subject in Gettier-style scenarios fails to have knowledge for reasons that are compatible with JTB, rather than because JTB is insufficient. On this basis, I defend the claim that a suitably formulated JTB theory remains intact and can be “perfect” in the sense of requiring no additional anti-luck condition beyond truth, belief, and justification (together with standard constraints on justification such as defeasibility). The paper concludes by clarifying what counts as the right kind of justification and by replying to prominent variants of the Gettier challenge.