In Defence of Artistic Value

In this essay, I critically examine Dominic McIver Lopes's theory of artistic value. Lopes denies the existence of non-aesthetic artistic value. He argues for a hybrid deflationary theory that claims that artistic value is aesthetic value realized within the art kind to which the artwork belongs. Due to his denial of explaining artistic value from an evaluation of art as art and by collapsing artistic value with aesthetic value, I argue Lopes' account as implausible. In doing so, I first examine several response papers to Lopes which, in different ways, defend the existence of a distinct artistic value, to conclude that these critiques reveal significant problems in Lopes's account. Second, I argue that none of the responses succeed in offering a positive account of artistic value and thereafter I suggest that we ought to return to a theory of art to explain artistic value. I argue that a disjunctive, non-essentialist theory of art is necessary to capture artistic diversity. Gaut's cluster theory effectively counters essentialist limitations, and together with the responses I suggest an alternative way of explaining artistic value. Third, I raise a potential worry: namely, whether the proposed cluster account would be able to distinguish between features that are merely present in a work of art and those that are artistically relevant. I argue that it is insufficient to explain artistic value simply by identifying features within an artwork; rather, such features must be realized in particular ways in relation to art as art. On this basis, I conclude that the concern can be addressed. Lastly, I argue that the alternative, restricting our notion of artistic value, is less desirable than embracing the diversity of art.