Multiplicity Without Distinction? Divine Ideas and Simplicity in Thomas Aquinas

This paper examines whether Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of divine exemplarism can be coherently reconciled with his commitment to divine simplicity. In Thomas’s view, God creates by means of certaindivine ideas called exemplars, which serve as the formal causes of creatures, and are located in the divine mind. These exemplar ideas are many, since each individual creature has a respective exemplar from which it receives its form. However, Thomas is simultaneously committed to a rigid form of divine simplicity, according to which the divine ideas are ontologically identical to the divine essence. This gives rise to the main question of this paper: Can a multiplicity of divine ideas, each serving as a distinct exemplar for a particular creature, be compatible with a God who is metaphysically simple and devoid of internal distinctions? After explicating Thomas’ views on the divine ideas as well as divine simplicity, the paper argues that the divine ideas need real ontological relations to their respective objects in the world in order to function as extrinsic formal causes, which Thomas views them as. It further argues that any ontological relation to one divine idea necessitates it being a relation to the divine essence as a whole, since all divine ideas are ontologically identical to God’s essence. Given Thomas’ belief that any creature is perfectly like its respective exemplar in form, and that the exemplar is identical to the divine essence, it seems to follow that any creature should be identical in form to the divine essence. Such a result threatens to collapse the distinction between God and creation, risking pantheistic implications incompatible with Thomas’ metaphysics.