The Art of Letting Go : A systems approach to post-conflict decentralization in Iraq

Decentralization is widely regarded as a beneficial policy for improving good governance and increasing the effectiveness of decision making. In some states, there is limited willpower from the government to realize decentralization or political reasons for why a strong central government is favorable. But there are also states with legally guaranteed and well-motivated ambitions to decentralize, where decentralization still is not effectively implemented. The aim of this paper is to explore potential reasons for why decentralization has been ineffective in these cases, and draw lessons from the post-conflict context of Iraq. Through a systems approach, the interaction between multiple levels of institutions can be viewed. The analysis applies a process-tracing method to assess two theoretical arguments, one being that illegal rent-seeking behavior is a probable cause of this ineffectiveness, and the other that the cause is failure by aid programmes known as local governance support to create bounded rulers; local leaders who govern more effectively because of their increased legitimacy and connectedness with the population. The findings suggest that the formerly mentioned is the most plausible, as corruption is a massive societal problem in Iraq and as it creates an unproportional resource scarcity in the implementation of decentralization policy.