Part I: A Core Framework and an Impossibility Result for Dynamic Social Evaluation under Irreversible Constraints
Abstract
This paper reports preliminary results from an ongoing research program on dynamic social evaluation under irreversible constraints. The scope of the present analysis is intentionally limited. We introduce a core framework in which social outcomes are modeled as infinite histories that include an irreversible state variable, and we establish a baseline impossibility result on the unrestricted domain under minimal regularity and anonymity requirements. The paper deliberately stops short of proposing solutions: in particular, it does not characterize admissible domain restrictions, does not derive representation theorems, and does not resolve the impossibility. The purpose of this paper is to isolate the structural source of incoherence in dynamic social evaluation under irreversible constraints.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Economic theories and models
Economic Theory and Institutions
Publication details
- Journal / source
- Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB)
- Volume
- 1122
- Pages
- 1–[5]
- Publication date
- 1 January 2026
- Language
- EN