The Discursive Construction of Nuclear Coercion: An Analysis of Russian Strategic Narratives and Their Impact on Western Decision-Making

In the contemporary security environment, information operations have transformed from an auxiliary element of conventional warfare into an independent domain of combat operations. The Russian Federation, operating within the framework of the "new generation warfare" doctrine (the Gerasimov Doctrine), has deployed a global information campaign in which the narrative of nuclear intimidation plays a pivotal role. This toolkit is not limited to tactical objectives but serves as a mechanism of strategic deterrence regarding aid to Ukraine from NATO member states. This report examines the mechanics of Russian nuclear blackmail through the lens of reflexive control and hybrid aggression, analyzes its impact on the Western political establishment, and assesses the consequences for the international security architecture. The foundation of the Russian strategy is the concept of "reflexive control"—a methodology for conveying specifically selected information to an adversary to induce them to voluntarily make decisions beneficial to the influencer. In the context of nuclear discourse, the Kremlin implemented the strategy of the "threat that leaves something to chance." By manipulating ontological uncertainty and existential fear, Moscow sought to convince Western leaders that the stakes in the conflict were significantly higher for the Russian Federation than for NATO, thereby activating "self-deterrence" mechanisms in Washington and Brussels.