What Explains Causal Selection

This paper explores some conceptual and empirical issues having to do with causal selection. It engages with portions of the substantial empirical literature on selection practices-- a literature that so far has received limited philosophical attention. This paper argues for the following claims: First, the causal judgments that involve selection are just one kind of causal judgment among many; It is a mistake to think that there is a single unitary "causal concept" that is displayed both in selection practices and in all other sorts of causal judgments. In part for this reason, the idea that the influence of social norms on causal selection poses a challange to the "objectivity" of causal claims generally is mistaken. Second, selection practices are not arbitrary or capricious but rather, as an empirical matter, exhibit regular patterns and often appear to have a "rational” basis or a “functional" rationale, although there are several different candidates for such a basis. Several possibilities are discussed: the idea that selection judgments are guided by a certain combination of necessity and strength (NES) , the idea that these practices convey information about optimal interventions, and the idea they are guided by a concern with causal attribution and the idea that they track judgments of "robust sufficiency". NES fits much but not all of the emiprical data but the optimal intervention rationale performs better in at least one case, which can also be understood in terms of a certain interpretation of robust sufficiency. I also defend the third causal attribution rationale as deserving further exploration.