De Interpretatione 16a3–9: In Defence of the Two-Step Account of Aristotelian Signification

This thesis examines Aristotle’s account of signification in De Interpretatione 1, 16a3–9, a passage traditionally read as articulating a two-step semantic structure: spoken sounds signify affections of the soul, and through them further signify things in the world. In recent decades, this traditional interpretation has been challenged by two independent ‘one-step’ readings of the passage, advanced by Norman Kretzmann (1974) and Simón Noriega-Olmos (2013). These readings deny that Aristotle is committed to any mediated signification of extramental objects in this passage. After a detailed textual analysis of De Int. 16a3–9 and a survey of Aristotle’s treatment of signification elsewhere in the corpus, the thesis articulates a set of desiderata for an adequate interpretation of the passage. It then offers sustained critical assessments of the one-step challenges. Chapter 3 examines Kretzmann’s proposal, arguing that it relies on an unduly restrictive understanding of the key terms ‘symbol’ (σύμβολον) and ‘sign’ (σημεῖον) in the passage. Chapter 4 turns to Noriega-Olmos’ more sophisticated one-step account, which grounds signification exclusively in thought and appeals to a formal account of likeness drawn from De Anima. While acknowledging the strengths of this approach, the thesis argues that Noriega-Olmos mischaracterises the two-step view, overburdens particular textual features of the passage, and ultimately fails to justify the exclusion of mediated signification of things. The thesis concludes that the traditional two-step interpretation of De Int. 16a3–9 can be defended against these one-step challenges. Rather than undermining the two-step framework, the challenge from one-step readings serves to clarify the commitments of the two-step view and to sharpen the conditions under which it can be coherently and defensibly maintained.