The right to legal aid for suspects and accused persons in the European Union: Directive (EU) 2016/1919

This doctoral dissertation offers a systematic examination of legal aid as an essential guarantee of the right of defence and a fundamental component of the right to a fair trial within the framework of European and national criminal procedural law. The study analyses the normative and jurisprudential framework shaped by the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and relevant European Union legislation, with particular emphasis on Directive (EU) 2016/1919 concerning legal aid for suspects and accused persons. Particular emphasis is placed on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, from which functional criteria are derived for triggering the State’s obligation to provide legal assistance, notably in relation to the financial incapacity of the accused, the interests of justice, and the requirement of substantive and effective, rather than merely formal, legal representation. The dissertation demonstrates that legal aid does not constitute a mere procedural formality, but rather a positive obligation inherent in the rule of law, aimed at ensuring practical and effective access to justice. The study further examines the transposition of the EU legal framework into Greek law, assessing the degree of compliance of domestic legislation with European Union and Convention standards. In addition, a comparative analysis of legal aid systems in other jurisdictions highlights alternative organizational models and mechanisms for ensuring the quality of legal assistance. The dissertation concludes by advancing proposals for institutional and organizational reform of the Greek legal aid system, seeking a transition from fragmented and frequently formalistic implementation towards a coherent and effective framework for the provision of legal assistance. A central finding of the research is that effective legal representation is not recognized as an autonomous value, but as a necessary precondition for the substantive realization of the right to a fair trial and, consequently, as an indicator of the quality and credibility of the rule of law.