Ett centrum för fiendens underrättelsetjänst : Det svenska kontraspionaget mot tysk underrättelseverksamhet 1939–1943 och vad det innebar för svensk säkerhetsstrategi.

This thesis examines the role of Swedish counterespionage against German intelligence activities between 1939 and 1943, within the context of Sweden’s grand strategy. During the Second World War, the Swedish national coalition government maintained a policy of neutrality and remained non-belligerent throughout the conflict. However, this policy has been a subject of intense debate since the war’s end. A central point of contention, noted in the parliamentary inquiry into the wartime security services, involves accusations that the authorities failed to combat German espionage with the same resolve as its Allied counterparts. The primary objective of this study is to explain why German intelligence operations necessitated an offensive Swedish counterespionage response. The study applies qualitative content analysis to examine archival source material, including security service directives and diplomatic correspondence. The theoretical framework integrates Jacob Westberg’s (2021) concepts of grand strategy with Per Cramér’s (1989) analysis of neutrality law. The findings demonstrate that counterespionage functioned as a vital instrument for "neutrality protection". The offensive approach – characterized by active surveillance and the removal of key German personnel – was essential to safeguard national sovereignty and critical infrastructure, particularly in the strategic hub of Gothenburg. Ultimately, the thesis argues that an offensive strategy was a fundamental necessity for maintaining the credibility of Swedish neutrality while navigating the strategic pressure from Nazi Germany.