Random Connections and Violence in the French Revolution
Abstract
Networks can help actors survive violence in revolutions. Connections could protect against reprisals and provide information. However, personal networks are not randomly assigned, making it difficult to causally trace their role. The French Constituent Assembly of 1789 randomly assigned legislators to smaller groups, which we use to assess outcomes in the ensuing revolution such as violent death and emigration. Violent death was contagious among the nobility in these networks. However, connections to two key leaders, Lafayette and Robespierre, were protective against violent death, encouraging emigration, regardless of ideological differences. We argue that nobles drew an informational advantage from their connections.
Fields of Study & Subjects
European Political History Analysis
Political Conflict and Governance
Social Capital and Networks
Publication details
- Journal / source
- HAL
- Publication date
- 1 February 2026
- Language
- EN
- Document type
- Preprint