La fenomenalización del fenómeno: líneas fundamentales de una metafísica fenomenológica

This paper aims to clarify the status of the concept of phenomenon within the framework of a refoundation of phenomenology understood as transcendental idealism. This refoundation seeks to highlight the theoretical insufficiencies of the Husserlian —and post-Husserlian— approach to phenomenology and to develop alternative proposals that do not abandon transcendental idealism, but rather reinforce it. This new orientation, called constructive phenomenology, aims to carry phenomenology beyond the field delimited by Husserl through speculative considerations and understands itself as a contribution to a phenomenological metaphysics. First, it will be shown that it is necessary to distinguish between two concepts of phenomenon. One of them —the one that is, so to speak, more deeply grounded and serves as the basis for the other— requires an initial phenomenological construction, whose meaning will be clarified. Secondly, the question of the philosophical-transcendental self-understanding of the phenomenon will be addressed, that is, the self-foundation of knowledge as “image.” This makes it necessary to introduce a third concept of phenomenon: the originary phenomenon, together with a second phenomenological construction. This response implies, at the same time, a reflection on the ground of appearing. Finally, the concept of reality that follows from the foregoing will be examined.