Essays on Strategic Dimensions of Corporate Disclosure : Design and Outcomes

This thesis investigates strategic dimensions of corporate disclosure design and their effects on information outcomes. Chapter 2 examines how the level of disaggregation in target firms' disclosure of assets held for sale affects acquiring shareholders' decision-making in partial-firm acquisitions. I find that higher disaggregation is associated with stronger market reactions, suggesting that detailed disclosure reduces information uncertainty. Furthermore, I show that this effect is more pronounced when deal materiality is higher, when gains or losses on disposal are larger, and when alternative information sources are limited. Overall, the results demonstrate that disclosure granularity matters for decision-usefulness in complex transaction settings. Chapter 3 investigates how General Counsel participation in top management affects the balance between strategic communication and legal risk management during earnings calls. I find that GCs play a dual role in shaping disclosure: their presence in top management is associated with higher net positive sentiment in scripted Management Discussion sections but increased hedging language and non-answer responses during unscripted Q&A sessions. Cross-sectional tests reveal that performance-based compensation and CEO alignment strengthen the optimistic messaging effect, while longer GC tenure and higher ex-ante litigation risk amplify cautious behavior. This study provides novel evidence on how legal professionals systematically influence corporate communication strategies. Chapter 4 examines whether narrative alignment between acquirer and target executives in M&A announcements predicts subsequent goodwill impairment. Using textual analysis of M&A press releases, I find that greater semantic similarity between executive statements is associated with lower likelihood of goodwill impairment within the first year after deal completion. Furthermore, I show that this relationship is stronger when goodwill represents a larger share of the purchase price and in cross-industry acquisitions. The effect disappears for acquirers with high analyst coverage, indicating that external monitoring substitutes for the informational role of narrative alignment. This paper identifies a novel early predictor of goodwill impairment through textual analysis of deal announcements.