“¿Qué sería de la naturaleza sin el hombre?”: naturaleza, meta-ontología y la radicalización metafísica de la ontología fundamental

In this text, I will offer an interpretation and defense of “meta-ontology” as it was presented by Heidegger in the late 1920s. To this end, after contextualizing its emergence, I will argue that Heidegger’s metaphysical project must be understood primarily as (1) a novel way of thinking about “things” or “beings” in light of the results of fundamental ontology and (2) as an attempt to establish nature as the ontic ground of worldliness, and therefore of all possible ontology. I will then address two criticisms directed at meta-ontology: (a) that meta-ontology constitutes a “step back” toward a pre-critical stance; and (b) that it is a mere transitional figure —not yet sufficiently radical— between a phenomenological-transcendental framework and a genuinely “post-metaphysical” philosophy. I will attempt to show that both criticisms stem from a misrepresentation of Heidegger’s project. In my concluding remarks, I will show some possible connections between meta-ontology and certain current trends in philosophy, in order to suggest its current relevance.