Group-level cooperation

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Authors: Nicolas Quérou
Cited by: 0
References: 29

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Abstract

We analyze the existence, coordination and efficiency effects of group-level cooperation in games featuring heterogeneous strategic spillovers and externalities within and between groups of agents. Conclusions depend on whether out-group interactions feature strategic substitutes or complements. Under high out-group strategic spillovers, group-level cooperation triggers either equilibrium existence or coordination issues. When these effects are not too high, a unique group-level cooperation equilibrium exists and its characterization depends on the in-group externality level. With respect to efficiency, cases are characterized under which this initiative is self-enforcing. Conditions are also provided under which it backfires: the cooperating group members would be actually better off if they could ex-ante commit to not cooperate, even if it would be costly to do so.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
HAL
Pages
36 p.
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN
Document type
Preprint