Reversal Costs and Executive Overreach

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Authors: Federico Trombetta
Cited by: 0
References: 21

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Abstract

Executives may implement legally contestable policies aggressively before courts reach a final legality determination, creating reliance and other sunk effects that make reversal costly.We study a complete-information sequential game in which an executive chooses policy aggressiveness and a court then decides whether to uphold the policy or strike it.If reversal costs increase sufficiently convexly in aggressiveness, the court strikes mild policies but upholds sufficiently aggressive ones to avoid disruption.Anticipating this, the executive overreaches-choosing a policy more extreme than its ideal point-to deter full reversal, yielding inefficient excess implementation relative to a commitment benchmark.Institutions that limit pre-review sunk effects (stays, phased implementation, expedited review) mitigate this distortion.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Judicial and Constitutional Studies Law Economics and Judicial Systems Legal and Constitutional Studies

Publication details

Journal / source
PubliCatt (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)
Publication date
1 January 2026
Language
EN