On the Generality of Ground

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Authors: Hannah M Kunkel
Cited by: 0
References: 25

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Abstract

It is widely held that true grounding claims are general. That is, individual grounding facts are subsumable under general patterns or principles of ground. In this paper, I advocate a novel position in the theory of ground on which particular grounding facts do not generalize to yield patterns of ground. This is not an argument for grounding pluralism, but is analogous to particularist views in metaethics which hold that moral principles are not general, but particular. If true, particularism about ground dissolves a serious challenge to the theory of ground, Louis deRosset's connection problem for non-reductivism. However, rejecting the generality of ground undermines our tests for the plausibility of grounding claims and prevents an inference from grounding facts to general explanations, thus threatening the utility of ground for metaphysical theorizing.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology Ethics and Metaphysics Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation

Publication details

Journal / source
ScholarsArchive (Brigham Young University)
Publication date
16 March 2026
Language
EN